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Letter from the President
When I took office as president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2005, I reorganized our Re-
search Department to make the study of globalization and its implications for U.S. monetary policy our 
signature research issue. My belief then, as now, was that the models we use to think about monetary 
policy in the U.S. give too little weight to developments beyond our borders, as I outlined in a lecture 
given at Harvard University on Nov. 3, 2005 (see page 27). In essence, policymakers were thinking as 
if the tectonic events of the past two decades had never happened. Yet the evidence that the world has 
changed—had changed utterly—confronts us every day in every aspect of our lives. We see it where we 
work, when we shop, and in how we save, invest and borrow. 
In the fall of 2007, we launched the Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute to focus our efforts 
in this area, and I am pleased to introduce the institute’s first annual report. The researchers who form 
the core of the institute’s staff have been very active developing research programs that will advance our 
understanding of what globalization means for monetary policy, circulating their analyses in working 
paper form, presenting their findings at prominent conferences and university seminars, and submitting 
their papers to peer-reviewed journals. Their efforts have been complemented by a group of prominent 
senior fellows and a growing list of research associates. Some of the emerging research themes are 
highlighted in institute Director Mark Wynne’s essay, “First Steps”—measuring the extent to which an 
economy is globalized, the controversial “global slack hypothesis” and “decoupling,” and the political 
aspects of monetary policy making in open economies. 
But this is just a start, the first steps in what will no doubt be a long journey. The challenges (and 
opportunities) that globalization presents us with are many. The events of the past year have under-
lined the importance of understanding the nature of the trade and investment relationships that tie our 
individual economies into a single global economy. The Dallas Fed’s Globalization and Monetary Policy 
Institute will be at the leading edge of this research.
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In 2008, for only the third time since its 
creation in 1969, the Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economics was awarded for research in interna-
tional economics.1 The recipient, Paul Krugman 
of Princeton University, received the award for 
“his analysis of trade patterns and the location of 
economic activity.” In addition to his work on what 
came to be known as the “new trade theory” and 
economic geography, Krugman made important 
contributions to the study of international finan-
cial crises. Few awards have been so timely: The 
world currently finds itself in the midst of the larg-
est global financial crisis since the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s, and the crisis has underlined the 
importance of thinking about monetary policy and 
financial stability in a global instead of a purely 
national context.
The global nature of the crisis that began in 
August 2007 is a reflection of the extent to which 
the economies of different countries have become 
integrated into a single global economy over the 
past two decades or so. Financial globalization, the 
greater mobility of capital across national bor-
ders, was pivotal to the boom in the U.S. housing 
market that preceded the crisis. It has also been 
the primary conduit whereby problems in the 
U.S. housing market have been transmitted to the 
rest of the world. Real globalization, the surge in 
global trade in goods and services, is also playing 
an important role in the current cyclical episode, 
as slower growth overseas limits the potential 
for U.S. export growth, and weaker growth in the 
U.S. reduces demand for imports from emerging 
market economies.
This essay reviews some of the issues we see 
as crucial to advancing our understanding of glo-
balization’s implications for U.S. monetary policy 
and highlights some of the research we have been 
doing to shed light on these issues. We will make 
no claim to being comprehensive. Rather, our 
objective is to describe some of the initial steps we 
have taken toward developing a research agenda 
and show how it fits in with the broader literature.
How Globalized Is the U.S. Economy?
Monetary policy makers in small open econo-
mies are used to thinking about external events 
when making their policy decisions. One only has 
to peruse the monthly bulletins or inflation reports 
of central banks around the world to get a sense of 
the importance they attach to the international en-
vironment when assessing the outlook for inflation 
and real economic activity in their economies. But 
for a large, seemingly relatively closed economy 
such as the U.S., surely international develop-
ments are of secondary importance. We frequently 
encountered this argument when the Dallas Fed 
started pushing this research program three years 
ago. 
Let’s start with the assertion that the U.S. is a 
relatively closed economy. When we think about 
the extent to which an economy is open to the rest 
of the world, the measure most commonly looked 
at is the ratio of imports of goods and services to 
GDP. This measure has a certain intuitive appeal: 
Obviously, if a country is completely isolated from 
the rest of the world, it won’t be importing any-
thing and the ratio will be zero. As a country opens 
up to the rest of the world, imports will grow and 
the ratio should increase. Figure 1 plots the ratio 
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of imports of goods and services to U.S. GDP since 
1929. Through the mid-1960s, imports amounted 
to less than 5 percent of GDP. But starting in the 
mid-1960s, imports increased as a share of GDP, 
and as of 2007, amounted to just over 17 percent. 
Note that the increase seems to have occurred in 
two steps: the first from the mid-1960s through the 
early 1980s, when imports leveled off at about 10 
percent of GDP; and then starting around 1990, 
when imports again began to grow relative to GDP 
and have yet to show any sign of leveling off. 
So by this measure, it could be said that the 
U.S. is three times more globalized today than it 
was in the early post–World War II period. But 
also by this measure, despite the big increase in 
imports relative to GDP, the U.S. remains relatively 
closed. Just looking at our NAFTA partners, in both 
Canada and Mexico imports amount to about 
one-third of GDP, about twice their importance to 
the U.S. Looking farther afield, in Ireland imports 
amounted to more than two-thirds of GDP in 
recent years, while in Belgium the share of imports 
was 85 to 90 percent. 
But the volume of imports relative to overall 
economic activity is a very incomplete measure 
of the extent to which a country is integrated with 
the rest of the world. First, most economists would 
argue that a better measure of integration would 
look at price data and ask whether goods and 
services in the domestic market sell at something 
close to their world prices. A country would be 
considered globalized if the prices of a representa-
tive basket of goods and services were not that 
different from those prevailing on world markets; 
a country would be considered more global-
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prices. We see this approach employed frequently 
in historical analyses of globalization (see, for 
example, O’Rourke and Williamson 2002a, b) but 
less frequently in the literature on contemporary 
globalization due to data problems.2
Indeed, if we think about defining economic 
integration in terms of how close domestic prices 
are to world prices, it quickly becomes obvious 
that the ratio of imports to GDP can severely 
understate the degree to which an economy is 
globalized. For example, if domestic prices were 
identical to world prices, there might be no incen-
tive to engage in international trade and the share 
of imports in GDP would be zero. Yet globalization 
would have very real consequences for the pricing 
power of domestic firms: The threat of imports 
would limit their ability to pass on price increases 
to their domestic customers. 
Guilloux and Kharroubi (2008) illustrate 
this point concretely by showing how the impact 
of import price inflation on overall inflation is 
qualitatively different for commodity imports 
and noncommodity imports in the industrial-
ized countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development over the period 
1980–2005. They show that whereas the overall 
volume of commodity imports is an important 
determinant of the impact of commodity import 
inflation on domestic commodity inflation, the 
impact of noncommodity import inflation on 
domestic noncommodity inflation is independent 
of the volume of noncommodity imports. As they 
note, “Noncommodity imports are essentially 
manufactured goods for which contestability ex-
ists. Hence domestic producers modify their prices 
according to the price of imports or according 
to the international price whatever the effective 
volume of imports because the threat of possible 
imports triggered by arbitrage opportunities stem-
ming from price gaps is credible.”
But globalization is about more than just 
trade. The global financial crisis that began in Au-
gust 2007 and intensified over the course of 2008 
would have taken a very different course were 
it not for the extraordinary increase in financial 
globalization over the past two decades. Capital is 
more mobile internationally than it was 35 years 
ago. 
One simple measure of the extent to which 
a country is financially globalized is given by the 
ratio of its foreign assets and liabilities to its GDP. 
Figure 2 shows this ratio for the U.S. from 1970 
through 2004 using data from Lane and Milesi-Fer-
retti (2006). It is well known that the U.S. has be-
come a net debtor to the rest of the world in recent 
decades. But as we have accumulated liabilities to 
the rest of the world through our borrowing, we 
have continued to lend and invest overseas on a 
massive scale. As of 2004, the last year for which 
data are available from this particular source, U.S. 
foreign assets and liabilities amounted to nearly 
two times U.S. GDP.3
How do we combine a measure of financial 
globalization with a measure of real globalization 
to arrive at a single index? Indeed, how do we 
incorporate information on the extent to which 
the U.S. labor market is open into our measure of 
globalization? The United States has long been a 
destination of choice for international migrants. 
Over the past decade, net international migration 
into the U.S. has amounted to more than 1 million 
people a year. Some 12.5 percent of the current 
U.S. population is estimated to have been born 
overseas. The ability of the U.S. to draw on a large 
stock of foreign workers has been a significant 
source of strength for the U.S. economy over the 
years, and the cyclical response of migration to 
economic conditions in the U.S. helps alleviate 
labor market pressures.
Quantifying the extent to which the U.S. is 
globalized or has become more globalized over 
time is a nontrivial exercise. Even if we confine 
ourselves to the economic dimensions of global-
ization—the extent to which the U.S. economy has 
become more integrated into the global econo-
my—the measures commonly used have short-
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comings and are not easily combined in a single 
indicator. An important area for future research is 
to understand the limitations of existing measures 
and try to come up with better ones.
The Global Slack Hypothesis
Few relationships play a more central role in 
debates about monetary policy than the Phillips 
curve, the negative relationship between inflation 
and resource utilization. It is generally accepted 
that this relationship has changed in many coun-
tries in recent years, although the exact reason 
for the change is not well understood. Some have 
argued that better monetary policy is the explana-
tion, while others have asserted that globalization 
is the key. That is, as countries have begun to trade 
more with each other, foreign slack in addition to 
domestic slack matters for domestic inflation de-
velopments. This so-called global slack hypothesis 
is arguably one of the more controversial hypoth-
eses advanced in the debate over globalization’s 
potential implications for U.S. monetary policy. 
Although the notion that foreign resource utiliza-
tion might be an important determinant of U.S. 
inflation was explored in a number of papers in the 
1990s (Garner 1994, Orr 1994 and Tootell 1998), 
the debate was reinvigorated by Borio and Filardo’s 
(2007) comprehensive analysis. They found an 
increased role for foreign slack as a determinant 
of inflation in a variety of countries and attributed 
this to globalization. Subsequent research by Ihrig 
et al. (2007) raised questions about the robustness 
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As a matter of theory, foreign slack should 
matter for domestic inflation developments in the 
new neoclassical synthesis/new Keynesian mod-
els of Goodfriend and King (1997) and Clarida, 
Galí and Gertler (2000). These models combine 
elements from the real business-cycle models 
of Kydland and Prescott (1982) with the sorts of 
nominal rigidities long emphasized in Keynesian 
models of the business cycle to create a framework 
that has proven extremely useful in thinking about 
monetary policy. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2002) 
extend the basic model to an open-economy 
setting and consider some of the challenges 
monetary policy makers face in a more globalized 
environment.5 
What remains a challenge is understanding 
why the relationship between U.S. inflation and 
measures of foreign resource utilization is so frag-
ile in the data. It may be because the measurement 
of output gaps is itself an exercise fraught with 
difficulty, and these difficulties are compounded 
when seeking to operationalize the concept in 
countries where data are limited and of question-
able accuracy.6 Another concern is that the theory-
consistent measure of the output gap may bear 
little or no relationship to the traditional measures 
employed in empirical studies to date. 
Decoupling
Yet another reason it might be difficult to 
detect evidence for the global slack hypothesis in 
the data is the seemingly significant synchroniza-
tion of economic activity around the world. When 
the current crisis began to unfold late in the sum-
mer of 2007, there was some hope that continued 
strong growth in the emerging giants (such as 
China, India and Brazil) might be able to sustain 
global growth as the more advanced economies 
slipped into recession. This idea was referred to 
as decoupling, with growth in emerging markets 
no longer dependent on their ability to sell to the 
richer countries. By the fall of 2008, however, that 
idea seemed to have been put to rest: The crisis 
that began in the North Atlantic region had spread 
with a vengeance to the rest of the world. Once 
we abstract from the rapid rates of trend growth 
in the emerging market economies, the ups and 
downs of economic activity that we refer to as the 
business cycle seem very synchronized across 
countries. Figure 3 shows the business-cycle 
component of GDP growth for the developed 
and developing countries, demonstrating how 
economic activity tends to rise and fall in tandem 
around the world.7 
In addition to posing an important challenge 
for empirical evaluation of the global slack hypoth-
esis, this synchronization of activity is interesting 
in and of itself. What causes it? Is it simply due to 
common shocks? For example, the prices of oil 
and other commodities are set on world markets, 
and movements in these prices tend to impact 
all countries at the same time, albeit differently 
depending on whether the country is a net user or 
net producer of the commodity and depending on 
the country’s production structure.8
Or perhaps trade linkages are the key? 
Frankel and Rose (1998) were the first to docu-
ment that countries with strong trade ties also 
tend to have highly correlated business cycles. 
How well do existing models explain this feature 
of the data? López (2007) examines the role of 
production sharing by Mexican maquiladoras as a 
mechanism through which shocks are transmitted 
from the U.S. to the maquiladora sector in Mexico 
and finds some success. However, Arkolakis and 
Ramanarayanan (2008) find in a more general 
setting that the standard mechanisms in existing, 
open-economy macro models cannot generate the 
degree of synchronization we see in the data. 
Globalization and Inflation
More-globalized countries seem to have 
lower inflation rates over long periods than less-
globalized countries do. This relationship was 
first noted by Romer (1993) and has spawned 
a significant research literature. Figure 4 shows 
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average annual inflation rates in a large group of 
countries over three decades relative to the degree 
of openness of the countries, as measured by the 
share of imports in their GDP. The clearly negative 
relationship holds up even after we control for a 
variety of other factors. Inflation over long periods 
is completely in the hands of monetary policy 
makers, and this chart raises the question of what 
it is about the monetary policy making process in 
more-open economies that causes policymakers 
in those economies to choose lower inflation rates. 
Is it the benign environment created by greater 
competition in domestic markets? Or the fear of 
capital flight if bad policies were to be pursued?9 
Or access to foreign factors of production that 
make supply more elastic? Perhaps low inflation 
and trade openness are driven by a common third 
factor, such as good institutions that pursue sound 
policies in all areas.
Many explanations have been advanced 
for the observed negative relationship between 
long-run inflation and openness as traditionally 
measured. Almost all are based on some variant 
of the time consistency problem that arises under 
discretionary monetary policy making first high-
lighted by Kydland and Prescott (1977). However, 
there have been relatively few attempts to develop 
formal general equilibrium models that account in 
a quantitative sense for what we see in the data. In 
the Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute’s 
first working paper, Evans (2007) developed a 
simple general equilibrium model to shed some 
light on the observed relationship and found that, 
contrary to what we see in the data, greater open-
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Next Steps
This essay has reviewed some of the themes 
emerging from the research being conducted 
at the institute. We are developing many more 
themes, which will be highlighted in future insti-
tute annual reports. We have not addressed issues 
concerning financial globalization in any great 
depth, yet it is clear that the growth of international 
capital markets is a crucial element of globaliza-
tion and has very direct implications for monetary 
policy, as recent events have shown.10 Nor have 
we addressed the issue of international pricing, 
which is at the core of many debates in contempo-
rary international macroeconomics. We expect to 
make significant contributions to this issue in the 
years ahead. 
An important part of our ongoing research en-
tails developing better models of the international 
economy. For all the progress that has been made 
in recent years, we are still a long way from having 
a workhorse model of the international macro-
economy that performs well on most dimensions. 
The seminal contribution of Backus, Kehoe and 
Kydland (1992, 1995) documented a number of 
anomalies that arise in a standard open-economy 
version of the Kydland and Prescott (1982) model. 
Foremost among these anomalies is that output 
appears to be more highly correlated across 
countries than consumption. This is the opposite 
of what we expect to see based on the model’s 
predictions and is clearly related to our ability to 
model international financial markets. 
The basic open-economy model of Clarida, 
Galí and Gertler (2002) builds on the method-
ological foundations laid by Kydland and Prescott 
and has proven useful for developing some 
understanding of monetary policy issues in an 
open-economy context. Nevertheless, the model 
has important shortcomings and can certainly be 
Figure 4
Long-Run Inflation Is Lower in More-Open Economies
Log average annual inﬂation, 1973–2007
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improved. To begin with, despite its roots in the 
real business-cycle literature, the model has no 
role for capital accumulation. For some questions, 
this may be a harmless abstraction, but for many 
others it is of vital importance. Given the central-
ity of capital accumulation to the business cycle 
in capitalist economies, it is difficult to imagine 
any consensus model not having a crucial role for 
capital. 
A second shortcoming of Clarida, Galí and 
Gertler’s framework is its inability to capture the 
effect of greater competition associated with 
globalization on firms’ markups.11 Finally, the as-
sumption about price setting at the firm level that 
is used to generate nominal rigidities in this model 
seems to be at variance with some microeconomic 
evidence on the frequency of price changes.
Indeed, even many features of trade flows 
and patterns are not well explained by the existing 
corpus of trade theory. We noted at the beginning 
of this essay that the 2008 Nobel Prize in econom-
ics was awarded for work that led to the develop-
ment of the new trade theory in the 1980s to better 
account for trade flows between similar countries. 
The recent work of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and 
Melitz (2003) has likewise deepened our under-
standing of geography’s role in trade patterns and 
trade’s impact on productivity at the firm level and 
is spurring the development of what is coming to 
be known as the new new trade theory.
In short, while economists already have many 
tools available for understanding globalization and 
what it might mean for monetary policy, there are 
numerous open questions, and these questions 




1 Previous Nobel laureates in economics who received 
the award for work in international economics were Bertil 
Ohlin and James Meade in 1977, who received the award 
“for their pathbreaking contribution to the theory of inter-
national trade and international capital movements” and 
Robert Mundell in 1999, who won the award “for his analy-
sis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange 
rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas.” 
Since the creation of the Nobel Prize in economics in 1969 
(or more accurately, the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel), 62 individuals have 
received the prize. In the press release announcing the 
1977 award to Ohlin and Meade, the Swedish Academy 
drew attention to what it called “the growing international-
ization of the economic system” as a key factor illustrating 
the importance of their contributions. The press release 
concluded, “It has become increasingly clear that problems 
related to the allocation of resources, business cycles and 
the distribution of income are very much international 
problems. This means that foreign trade, international price 
fluctuations, the international allocation of economic activi-
ties and the transfer of resources, as well as the interna-
tional payments system, have become dominant factors in 
economic analysis and economic policy.” Recall that John 
Maynard Keynes also used the term internationalization to 
describe the highly integrated global economy that existed 
prior to World War I. The use of the term globalization 
to refer to essentially the same phenomenon is of more 
recent vintage. The internationalization of the pre-WWI 
period and the 1960s and 1970s did exclude a significant 
part of the world’s population; globalization is internation-
alization for everyone.
2 See Knetter and Slaughter (1999).
3 A comparable figure is obtained using data reported by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
4 Calza (2008) evaluated the global slack hypothesis using 
euro-area data and finds little evidence that global output 
gaps matter for euro-area inflation.
5 Martinez-Garcia (2008) provides a detailed analysis of the 
basic two-country model, with a particular emphasis on 
exploring the implications of local currency pricing.
6 Some of these issues are explored in Wynne and Solomon 
(2007).
7 Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992, 1995) document a 
number of facts about the business-cycle behavior of 
macroeconomic aggregates in different countries and show 
how they are at variance with the predictions of a two-
country version of the Kydland and Prescott (1982) model.
8 Balke, Brown and Yücel (2008) examine the importance 
of oil price shocks for fluctuations in U.S. economic activity 
and find that they are less important than shocks to total 
factor productivity or the labor wedge.
9 Cox and Alm (2006) explored some of the ways in which 
globalization serves to discipline public policy in the Dallas 
Fed’s 2005 Annual Report.
10 A number of our working papers released over the past 12   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas • Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2008 Annual Report
year address important aspects of financial globalization. 
Curcuru, Dvorak and Warnock (2007) look at the returns 
differential of U.S. claims on the rest of the world over U.S. 
liabilities to the rest of the world and find that the apparent 
differential is a lot smaller than previously estimated. Kho, 
Stulz and Warnock (2008) seek to understand the evolution 
of home bias over time by combining standard portfolio 
theories of home bias with theories of insider ownership 
drawn from the corporate finance literature, developing an 
optimal ownership theory of home bias. They show that the 
home bias of U.S. investors toward the 46 countries with 
the largest equity markets did not fall over the past decade 
but did decrease toward countries in which the ownership 
by corporate insiders decreased. Finally, Devereux and 
Sutherland (2008) develop techniques that allow for more 
sophisticated modeling of financial markets in standard 
open-economy macro models.
11 The constant elasticity of substitution specification 
of preferences that is used in this and other models of 
open economies implies a constant markup of price over 
marginal cost, regardless of the degree of openness of the 
economy. Guerrieri, Gust and López-Salido (2008) develop 
an extension of the Clarida, Galí, Gertler model with 
variable demand elasticities and markups to examine the 
impact of foreign competition on desired markups. Auer 
and Fischer (2008) look at the effect of U.S. trade with 
labor-abundant nations on U.S. producer prices over the 
1997–2006 period. They show that when the nine labor-
abundant countries in their sample capture a 1 percent 
market share in a U.S. sector, U.S. producer prices decline 
by 2 to 3 percent. While the bulk of the price decline is due 
to induced productivity growth in the sector, a nontrivial 
(albeit not statistically significant) amount is due to 
decreased markups.
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Summary of Activities
When Richard Fisher took office on April 1, 
2005, as the 12th president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, he mandated that the Bank’s Re-
search Department make the study of globalization 
and its implications for U.S. monetary policy its sig-
nature research program. To that end, in Septem-
ber 2007, following two years of preparatory work 
that included the hiring of a group of economists to 
work specifically on this project, the Bank formally 
created a Globalization and Monetary Policy Insti-
tute. The institute has now been in business for just 
over one year, and it is appropriate to review what 
has been accomplished in that time.
Structure
The core permanent staff of the institute 
consists of a director, five staff economists and two 
research assistants. The research activity of this 
group is complemented by a small group of senior 
fellows, who primarily represent academia, and 
a slightly larger group of research associates, all 
of whom are currently drawn from other central 
banks. The activities of the institute are overseen 
by an advisory board, which is chaired by Stanford 
University professor John B. Taylor. (See the insti-
tute roster on page 33.)
Working Papers
The long-term business objective of the 
institute is to make the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas a recognized center of excellence in the 
study of globalization and how it alters the way 
policymakers should think about monetary policy. 
We believe that such recognition will only come 
with a demonstrated ability to contribute to the 
peer-reviewed literature at the highest levels, and 
so the promotion of rigorous academic research on 
key policy questions will be our main priority. To 
this end, the core business product of the institute 
is its working paper series. Through September 
2008, 20 papers have appeared in the series, with 
contributions from staff of the institute, senior 
fellows, research associates and other Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas staff. One of the papers has 
already been published in a peer-reviewed journal. 
“Cross-Border Returns Differentials,” by senior 
fellow Frank Warnock and coauthors Stephanie 
Curcuru and Tomas Dvorak, was published in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics in November 2008. 
These working papers address a wide range of is-
sues pertaining to globalization and its implications 
for U.S. monetary policy, ranging from whether 
global output gaps have become more important 
for domestic inflation dynamics than domestic 
output gaps, to examination of the determinants of 
real exchange rate movements. (For a complete set 
of working paper abstracts, see page 20.)
Conferences and Seminars
Staff economists affiliated with the institute 
have been active presenting their research at 
conferences and seminars. Over the past year, they 
have participated at the October 2007 meeting of 
the Federal Reserve System Committee on Interna-
tional Economic Analysis, the summer meetings of 
the Society for Economic Dynamics, the Midwest 
Macro Meetings, Midwest Economic Association, 
North American summer meetings of the Econo-
metric Society, 16th Annual Symposium of the 
Society for Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics, 
Conference on Methods and Topics in Economic 
and Financial Dynamics at the University of 
Texas at Dallas, 14th International Conference on 
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NBER Summer Institute and the 2008 Far Eastern 
Econometric Society Meeting. They have taken part 
in seminars at Texas A&M University, University 
of Texas at Arlington, Hong Kong University of Sci-
ence and Technology, Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Shanghai 
University of Finance and Economics, Vanderbilt 
University and the University of Western Ontario.
Staff have also served as discussants at a 
number of conferences and as referees for journals 
such as the Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal 
of International Economics, Journal of Development 
Economics and Review of Economic Dynamics. 
Institute staff have also been developing joint proj-
ects with researchers at other institutions (Bank of 
England, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors) and universities (University 
of Wisconsin, Yale University, Boston University, 
University of Virginia, Vanderbilt University), and 
one economist taught a course on globalization 
and monetary policy at the University of Alicante in 
Spain in December 2007.
The institute cosponsored the Murray S. 
Johnson Memorial Conference at the University of 
Texas at Austin in April. We organized a session on 
international pricing that featured research done 
at the institute (some preliminary findings from 
Anthony Landry’s IKEA project) and invited other 
prominent researchers on international pricing to 
participate in the session. (More details are pro-
vided in the conference summary on page 16.)
Bank Publications
In addition to producing working papers 
intended for publication in academic journals and 
other peer-reviewed publications, the institute 
disseminates research through the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas’ publications. Over the past year, 
institute economists contributed two articles to the 
Bank’s Economic Letter series: “Why Are Exchange 
Rates So Difficult to Predict?” by Jian Wang, which 
appeared in the June 2008 issue, and “The Big Mac: 
A Global-to-Local Look at Pricing” by Anthony 
Landry, in the September 2008 issue. On the basis 
of his Economic Letter article, Wang was invited to 
contribute a web article to VoxEU, a policy portal 
maintained by the Center for Economic Policy 
Research in London to promote rigorous policy 
commentary by top researchers. (Wang’s article is 
available on the Internet at www.voxeu.org.) 
Mark Wynne and Erasmus Kersting published 
an article on “The Globalization of U.S. Business 
Investment” in the Bank’s Staff Papers series in 
February 2008, and Wynne gave an interview that 
appeared in the January/February 2008 issue of 
Southwest Economy sketching out plans for the 
institute. Institute senior fellow Charles Engel 
discussed globalization and the current financial 
crisis in a Southwest Economy interview. (Read the 
interview on page 30.) The institute also produces 
a regular update on international economic condi-
tions to complement the national and regional 
updates that have been published on the Bank’s 
website for several years. 
Visiting Scholars
Since its creation, the institute has hosted a 
number of visitors. In December 2007, professors 
Eric Young from the University of Virginia and Kim 
Ruhl from the University of Texas at Austin spent 
several days at the institute and gave seminars. 
In the spring, Jens Søndergaard of the Bank of 
England and professors Rody Manuelli from the 
University of Wisconsin, Costas Arkolakis from 
Yale University and Mario Crucini from Vanderbilt 
University each visited for a week, as did professors 
Ronald Jones of the University of Rochester and 
Roy Ruffin of the University of Houston. Sønder-
gaard has since joined the institute as a research 
associate, and Crucini has joined as a senior fellow.
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Conference on
International Economics
On April 4 and 5, 2008, the Globalization and 
Monetary Policy Institute, in collaboration with 
the Department of Economics at the University 
of Texas at Austin, cosponsored the Murray S. 
Johnson Memorial Conference on international 
economics in Austin. The conference brought to-
gether scholars to discuss a variety of international 
topics. Nine papers were grouped under three ses-
sions: exchange rates and capital flows, empirical 
international trade and international prices.
Exchange Rates and Capital Flows
The first session dealt with exchange rate 
movements and capital flows in emerging coun-
tries. The first paper was presented by Cristina 
Arellano from the University of Minnesota and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The paper, 
written jointly with Ananth Ramanarayanan from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, studies the ma-
turity composition of government debt in emerg-
ing countries. Arellano and Ramanarayanan note 
that governments in emerging countries issue debt 
in international markets with a volatile maturity 
structure: Debt issuances are mostly short-term 
when interest rate spreads are high and are mostly 
long-term when interest spreads are low.
Using a dynamic model of borrowing and 
defaults, the authors show that managing the ma-
turity of debt can provide benefits to the govern-
ment because of uncertainty over future interest 
rates. In their model, maturity composition of debt 
reflects the time-variation properties of long-term 
debt relative to the cost of short-term debt. On one 
hand, long-term debt is beneficial because it can 
hedge against variation in short-term interest rates. 
On the other hand, short-term debt is beneficial 
because it can deliver immediate liquidity. They 
find that the volatility of the maturity composition 
of government debt is indeed an optimal response 
to interest rate fluctuations experienced by emerg-
ing countries.
Other dimensions that characterize the rela-
tionship between sovereign debt and economic 
activity have been difficult to explain simultane-
ously using contemporary economic models. For 
example, three often-cited facts are that (i) default 
episodes are often associated with recessions, 
(ii) interest rates on sovereign debt and domestic 
output are negatively correlated, and (iii) external 
debt as a share of output is usually high. Vivian 
Z. Yue from New York University presented the 
second paper. Coauthored with Enrique Mendoza 
from the University of Maryland and the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the paper 
takes on the task of explaining these three facts 
through a model of sovereign default with endog-
enous output fluctuations.
Yue and Mendoza’s model borrows from the 
business-cycle literature a transmission mecha-
nism that links default risk with economic activity 
via the financing of working capital. Using numeri-
cal analysis, they show that the model can explain 
simultaneously these three facts of sovereign debt. 
The results hinge on three premises of the model: 
Imported inputs require working capital; domes-
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default on foreign obligations of firms and govern-
ment occurs simultaneously.
The third paper was presented by George 
Alessandria from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia. The paper, cowritten with Joseph Ka-
boski from Ohio State University and Virgiliu Mid-
rigan from New York University and NBER, looks 
at the implications of large swings in exchange 
rates on international trade. First, they highlight 
the importance of fixed transaction costs (such as 
document preparation, custom clearing, etc.) and 
delivery lags for international trade flows. Quanti-
tatively, these fixed costs amount to 3 to 11 percent 
of shipments. Given that most goods transacted 
across borders are storable, these costs make it 
optimal for importers to engage infrequently in 
international transactions and to hold substantial 
inventories of imported goods.
Building on this idea, they construct a dynam-
ic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of 
trade with fixed transaction costs and delivery lags 
to study international trade dynamics under large 
exchange rate variations. Following a currency 
devaluation, their model accounts well for the 
dynamics of import quantity and price observed 
in the data. That is, in response to unanticipated 
currency devaluations, importers reduce retail 
markups, reduce import quantities and reduce 
import variety.
Empirical International  Trade
The second session discussed topics in 
empirical international trade. The first two papers 
of the session look at the determinants of firms’ 
export behavior, while the final one studies the 
relationship between trade flows and income.
Current models of international trade often 
attach productivity or product quality as the single 
attribute to firms’ heterogeneity. While these 
models capture the salient fact that exporters tend 
to be large firms, this prediction leaves much of 
the observed relationship between firm size and 
export status unexplained.
The fourth paper was presented by Eric 
Verhoogen from Columbia University. The paper, 
cowritten with Maurice Kugler from Wilfrid Lau-
rier University and Harvard University, looks at the 
relationship between plant size and product qual-
ity and prices. Using Colombian manufacturing 
plant data, Verhoogen and Kugler find that (i) plant 
size and output prices are positively correlated 
within industries, (ii) plant size and input prices 
are positively correlated within industries, and (iii) 
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these correlations are more positive in industries 
with more scope for quality differentiation.
To account for these observed correlations, 
they augment the Melitz model of heterogeneous 
firms with quality differentiation in inputs and 
outputs. In their framework, input quality and 
plant size are complementary in determining 
output quality. They conclude that a model of qual-
ity differentiation of inputs and outputs is consis-
tent with the above correlation while difficult to 
reconcile with models that impose symmetry of 
homogeneity on both sets of goods.
The fifth paper was presented by Juan Carlos 
Hallak from Universidad de San Andres and 
NBER. Coauthored with Jagadeesh Sivadasan from 
the University of Michigan, the paper develops an 
alternative model of international trade with two 
sources of firm heterogeneity: productivity and 
caliber. Caliber reflects a firm’s ability to produce 
quality.
Compared with single-attribute models of 
firm heterogeneity emphasizing either produc-
tivity or product quality, Hallak and Sivadasan’s 
model produces a more nuanced characteriza-
tion of firms’ export behavior. In particular, size is 
not the sole determinant of export status because 
exporters differ in quality as well as productivity. 
They also demonstrate that conditional on size, 
exporters sell products of higher quality at higher 
prices, use capital more intensively and pay higher 
wages. 
Finally, Ana Cecilia Fieler from New York 
University presented the sixth paper, which studies 
the relationship between trade flows and income 
distribution. Standard empirical models of inter-
national trade predict that trade flows increase 
with both importer and exporter total income but 
ignore how total income is divided across popula-
tions. However, the data show that trade grows 
strongly with income per capita but is largely 
unresponsive to population growth.
Fieler develops a model of international trade 
that allows the elasticities of trade with respect 
to per capita income and population to diverge. 
In her model, goods are divided into two types: 
income elasticity of demand and heterogeneity 
in production technologies. In equilibrium, low-
income countries consume relatively more goods 
of the low-income elasticity type, and they have a 
comparative advantage in producing goods with 
low levels of heterogeneity in production tech-
nologies. Using data on bilateral trade flows, Fieler 
shows that her model improves the predictions of 
standard empirical models regarding variations 
due to income per capita and population.
International Prices
The last session looked at the relation be-
tween exchange rate movements and domestic 
prices. This is of particular importance given the 
recent movements in currency markets.
Recent theoretical work suggests a number 
of potentially important factors for the incomplete 
pass-through of exchange movements to prices. 
These include markup adjustment, local costs 
and menu costs. Emi Nakamura from Columbia 
University and NBER presented the seventh paper. 
She uses data on prices and sales of coffee beans 
to uncover the role of these factors in account-
ing for incomplete exchange rate pass-through. 
Nakamura finds that local costs and markup 
adjustments explain the bulk of incomplete pass-
through, while menu costs only explain a small 
fraction. Nevertheless, menu costs play an impor-
tant role since they explain the delayed response 
of price to costs. Moreover, she finds that delayed 
pass-through in the coffee industry occurs almost 
entirely at the wholesale rather than the retail level.
The eighth paper was presented by Mario 
Crucini from Vanderbilt University, who cowrote 
it with Hakan Yilmazkuday, also from Vanderbilt. 
The paper notes that price deviations for similar 
goods across countries are too large to be account-
ed for by transportation costs, tariffs and other bar-
riers to trade and too persistent to be accounted 
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Instead, a recent stream of empirical papers 
focuses on the notion that final goods are com-
posites of traded and nontraded components. 
Building on this literature, Crucini and Yilmazku-
day develop a model where trade occurs at the 
level of cities. Each city has two agents: a manufac-
turer that specializes in the production of a single 
homogenous good and a retailer that imports, 
bundles and distributes a variety of goods from 
other cities. In this environment, price dispersion 
arises because of trade costs via distances separat-
ing cities, consumer demand for a city-specific 
good and difference in productivity levels in the 
distribution sector.
Using micro price data, they explore the 
relative contribution of trade costs and distribu-
tion margins in accounting for price dispersion in 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). They find that trade costs 
are more important than distribution margins in 
accounting for price dispersion. However, the con-
tributions of distribution margins and trade costs 
are roughly equal when less-developed economies 
are included. This arises because measured wage 
differentials are small relative to price dispersion 
within the OECD. In contrast, larger wage differ-
entials between the OECD and the less-developed 
economies boost the contribution of distribution 
costs in accounting for price dispersion around the 
globe.
Finally, Anthony Landry from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas presented a paper on 
IKEA retail prices. While the empirical literature 
finds significant price deviations for similar goods 
across countries, the economic interpretations of 
those deviations are controversial. Most concerns 
are about the homogeneity of goods used to test 
deviations in the law of one price (LOP).
To avoid this concern, Landry looks at identi-
cal goods advertised in annual catalogs from the 
multinational IKEA. The large number of observa-
tions and the tractability of the database allow 
him to control for product heterogeneity, product 
turnover and price changes. Landry confirms sig-
nificant price deviations for similar goods across 
countries. In addition, he finds that most of the 
price dispersion is attributable to long-run LOP de-
viation. This suggests that some goods are always 
cheaper or more expensive in one country relative 
to another. While this new database confirms pre-
vious findings, IKEA micro price data should shed 
new light on questions related to LOP deviations. 
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Abstracts of Globalization and 
Monetary Policy Institute
Working Papers Issued from October 2007 through September 2008
No. 1
Is Openness Inflationary? 
Imperfect Competition and Monetary 
Market Power 
Richard W. Evans
abstract: Much empirical work has documented 
a negative correlation between different measures 
of globalization or openness and inflation levels 
across countries and across time. However, there is 
much less work exploring this relationship through 
structural international models based on explicit 
microeconomic foundations. This paper asks the 
question of how the degree of openness of an 
economy affects the equilibrium inflation level in 
a simple two-country OLG model with imperfect 
competition in which the monetary authority in 
each country chooses the money growth rate to 
maximize the welfare of its citizens. I find that a 
higher degree of openness in a country is as-
sociated with a higher equilibrium inflation rate. 
This result is driven by the fact that the monetary 
authority enjoys a degree of monopoly power in 
international markets as foreign consumers have 
some degree of inelasticity in their demand for 
goods produced in the home country. The deci-
sion of the monetary authority is then to balance 
the benefits of increased money growth that 
come from the open economy setting with the 
well-known consumption tax costs of inflation. In 
addition, I find that the level of imperfect competi-
tion among producers within a country is a perfect 
substitute for the international market power of 
the monetary authority in extracting the monopoly 
rents available in this international structure.
No. 2
A Monetary Model of the Exchange 
Rate with Informational Frictions  
Enrique Martinez-Garcia
abstract: Data for the U.S. and the euro area during 
the post-Bretton Woods period show that nominal 
and real exchange rates are more volatile than con-
sumption, very persistent, and highly correlated 
with each other. Standard models with nominal 
rigidities match reasonably well the volatility and 
persistence of the nominal exchange rate, but 
require an average contract duration above four 
quarters to approximate the real exchange rate 
counterparts. I propose a two-country model 
with financial intermediaries and argue that: First, 
sticky and asymmetric information introduces 
a lag in the consumption response to currently 
unobservable shocks, mostly foreign. Accordingly, 
the real exchange rate becomes more volatile to in-
duce enough expenditure-switching across coun-
tries for all markets to clear. Second, differences in 
the degree of price stickiness across markets and 
firms weaken the correlation between the nominal 
exchange rate and the relative CPI price. This 
correlation is important to match the moments 
of the real exchange rate. The model suggests that 
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stickiness account better for the stylized facts 
without relying on an average contract duration for 
the U.S. larger than the current empirical estimates.
No. 3
International  Trade in Durable Goods: 
Understanding Volatility, Cyclicality, 
and Elasticities 
Charles Engel and Jian Wang
abstract: Data for OECD countries document: 1. 
imports and exports are about three times as vola-
tile as GDP; 2. imports and exports are procyclical, 
and positively correlated with each other; 3. net 
exports are countercyclical. Standard models fail 
to replicate the behavior of imports and exports, 
though they can match net exports relatively well. 
Inspired by the fact that a large fraction of interna-
tional trade is in durable goods, we propose a two-
country two-sector model in which durable goods 
are traded across countries. Our model can match 
the business cycle statistics on the volatility and 
comovement of the imports and exports relatively 
well. In addition, the model with trade in durables 
helps to understand the empirical regularity noted 
in the trade literature: home and foreign goods are 
highly substitutable in the long run, but the short-
run elasticity of substitution is low. We note that 
durable consumption also has implications for the 
appropriate measures of consumption and prices 
to assess risk-sharing opportunities, as in the em-
pirical work on the Backus–Smith puzzle. The fact 
that our model can match data better in multiple 
dimensions suggests that trade in durable goods 




Stephanie E. Curcuru, Tomas Dvorak and 
Francis E. Warnock
abstract: Were the U.S. to persistently earn sub-
stantially more on its foreign investments (“U.S. 
claims”) than foreigners earn on their U.S. invest-
ments (“U.S. liabilities”), the likelihood that the 
current environment of sizable global imbalances 
will evolve in a benign manner increases. However, 
we find that the returns differential of U.S. claims 
over U.S. liabilities is far smaller than previously 
reported and, importantly, is near zero for portfolio 
equity and debt securities. For portfolio securities, 
we confirm our finding using a separate dataset 
on the actual foreign equity and bond portfolios of 
U.S. investors and the U.S. equity and bond port-
folios of foreign investors; in the context of equity 
and bond portfolios, we find no evidence that 
the U.S. can count on earning more on its claims 
than it pays on its liabilities. Finally, we reconcile 
our finding of a near zero returns differential with 
observed patterns of cumulated current account 
deficits, the net international investment position, 
and the net income balance.
Published as “Cross-Border Returns Differentials” 
in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 123, no. 4, 
November 2008.
No. 5
Production Sharing and Real Business 
Cycles in a Small Open Economy
José Joaquín López
abstract: Production sharing and vertical spe-
cialization account for a significant share of trade 
between developed and developing countries. The 
Mexican maquiladora industry provides an ideal 
example of production sharing in a small open 
economy. The typical “maquila” imports most of its 
inputs from and exports all its output to the United 
States. This article tries to determine to what extent 
production sharing, as in the Mexican maqui-
ladora, can serve as a transmission mechanism 
of business cycles in small open economies. We 
utilize a simple, two-sector, small open economy 
model of real business cycles that incorporates 
production sharing in the traded sector. The trans-
mission channel of business cycles is introduced 
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sector, originated in the United States’ manufactur-
ing sector. The model is successful in replicating 
real business cycles statistics for the maquiladora 
sector, as well as some of the characteristics of the 
nontraded sector.
No. 6
Driving Forces of the Canadian 
Economy: An Accounting Exercise 
Simona E. Cociuba and Alexander Ueberfeldt
abstract: This paper analyzes the Canadian 
economy for the post-1960 period. It uses an ac-
counting procedure developed in Chari, Kehoe, 
and McGrattan (2006). The procedure identifies 
accounting factors that help align the predictions 
of the neoclassical growth model with macro-
economic variables observed in the data. The 
paper finds that total factor productivity and the 
consumption–leisure trade-off—the productiv-
ity and labor factors—are key to understanding 
the changes in output, labor supply, and labor 
productivity observed in the Canadian economy. 
The paper performs a decomposition of the labor 
factor for Canada and the United States. It finds 
that the decline in the gender wage gap is a major 
driving force of the decrease in the labor market 
distortions. Moreover, the milder reduction in 
the labor market distortions observed in Canada, 
compared to the U.S., is due to a relative increase 
in effective labor taxes in Canada.
No. 7
Accounting for Persistence and Vola-
tility of Good-Level Real Exchange 
Rates:  The Role of Sticky Information
Mario J. Crucini, Mototsugu Shintani and 
Takayuki Tsuruga
abstract: Volatile and persistent real exchange rates 
are observed not only in aggregate series but also 
on the individual good-level data. Kehoe and Midri-
gan (2007) recently showed that, under a standard 
assumption on nominal price stickiness, empirical 
frequencies of micro price adjustment cannot rep-
licate the time-series properties of the law-of-one-
price deviations. We extend their sticky price model 
by combining good-specific price adjustment with 
information stickiness in the sense of Mankiw and 
Reis (2002). Under a reasonable assumption on the 
money growth process, we show that the model 
fully explains both persistence and volatility of 
the good-level real exchange rates. Furthermore, 
our framework allows for multiple cities within a 
country. Using a panel of U.S.–Canadian city pairs, 
we estimate a dynamic price adjustment process 
for each 165 individual goods. The empirical result 
suggests that the dispersion of average time of 
information update across goods is comparable to 
that of average time of price adjustment.
No. 8
How Should Central Banks Define 
Price Stability?
Mark A. Wynne
abstract: It is now generally accepted that the 
primary objective of central banks should be the 
maintenance of price stability. This paper con-
siders the question of how central banks should 
define price stability. I address three specific 
questions. First, should central banks target broad 
or narrow measures of inflation? Second, should 
central banks target headline or core measure of 
inflation? And third, should central banks define 
price stability as prevailing at some positive mea-
sured rate of inflation?
No. 9
Country Portfolios in Open Economy 
Macro Models
Michael B. Devereux and Alan Sutherland
abstract: This paper develops a simple approxima-
tion method for computing equilibrium portfolios 
in dynamic general equilibrium open economy 
macro models. The method is widely applicable, 
simple to implement, and gives analytical solutions 
for equilibrium portfolio positions in any combi-
nation or types of asset. It can be used in models Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2008 Annual Report • Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   23
with any number of assets, whether markets are 
complete or incomplete, and can be applied to 
stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models of 
any dimension, so long as the model is amenable to 
a solution using standard approximation methods. 
We first illustrate the approach using a simple two-
asset endowment economy model, and then show 
how the results extend to the case of any number of 
assets and general economic structure.
No. 10
Vehicle Currency
Michael B. Devereux and Shouyong Shi
abstract: While in principle, international pay-
ments could be carried out using any currency 
or set of currencies, in practice, the U.S. dollar is 
predominant in international trade and financial 
flows. The dollar acts as a “vehicle currency” in 
the sense that agents in nondollar economies will 
generally engage in currency trade indirectly using 
the U.S. dollar rather than using direct bilateral 
trade among their own currencies. Indirect trade 
is desirable when there are transactions costs of 
exchange. This paper constructs a dynamic general 
equilibrium model of a vehicle currency. We ex-
plore the nature of the efficiency gains arising from 
a vehicle currency and show how this depends 
on the total number of currencies in existence, 
the size of the vehicle currency economy, and the 
monetary policy followed by the vehicle currency’s 
government. We find that there can be very large 
welfare gains to a vehicle currency in a system of 
many independent currencies. But these gains 
are asymmetrically weighted toward the residents 
of the vehicle currency country. The survival of a 
vehicle currency places natural limits on the mon-
etary policy of the vehicle country.
No. 11
Globalization and Monetary Policy: 
An Introduction
Enrique Martinez-Garcia
abstract: Greater openness has become an 
almost universal feature of modern, developed 
economies. This paper develops a workhorse 
international model and explores the role of 
standard monetary policy rules applied to an open 
economy. For this purpose, I build a two-country 
DSGE model with monopolistic competition, 
sticky prices, and pricing-to-market. I also derive 
the steady state and a log-linear approximation of 
the equilibrium conditions. The paper provides a 
lengthy explanation of the steps required to derive 
this benchmark model and a discussion of (a) how 
to account for certain well-known anomalies in the 
international literature and (b) how to start “think-
ing” about monetary policy in this environment.
No. 12
Financial Globalization, Governance, 
and the Evolution of the Home Bias
Bong-Chan Kho, René M. Stulz and 
Francis E. Warnock
abstract: Standard portfolio theories of the home 
bias are disconnected from corporate finance 
theories of insider ownership. We merge the two 
into what we call the optimal ownership theory 
of the home bias. The theory has the following 
components. In countries with poor governance, 
it is optimal for insiders to own large stakes in 
corporations and for large shareholders to monitor 
insiders. Foreign portfolio investors will exhibit a 
large home bias against such countries because 
their investment is limited by the shares held by in-
siders (the “direct effect” of poor governance) and 
domestic monitoring shareholders (“the indirect 
effect”). Foreigners can also enter as foreign direct 
investors; if they are from countries with good gov-
ernance, they have a comparative advantage as in-
sider monitors in countries with poor governance, 
so that the relative importance of foreign direct 
investment in total foreign equity investment is 
negatively related to the quality of governance. Us-
ing two datasets, we find strong evidence that the 
theory can help explain the evolution of the home 
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average, the home bias of U.S. investors toward the 
46 countries with the largest equity markets did 
not fall during the past decade, but it decreased the 
most toward countries in which the ownership by 
corporate insiders decreased, and the importance 
of foreign direct investment fell in countries in 
which ownership by corporate insiders fell. Using 
firm-level data for Korea, we find evidence of the 
additional indirect effect of poor governance on 
portfolio equity investment by foreign investors.
No. 13
Globalization, Domestic Inflation and 
Global Output Gaps: 
Evidence from the Euro Area
Alessandro Calza
abstract: This paper tests whether the proposition 
that globalization has led to greater sensitivity of 
domestic inflation to the global output gap (the 
“global output gap hypothesis”) holds for the euro 
area. The empirical analysis uses quarterly data 
over the period 1979–2003. Measures of the global 
output gap using two different weighting schemes 
(based on PPPs and trade data) are considered. 
We find little evidence that global capacity 
constraints have either explanatory or predictive 
power for domestic consumer price inflation in the 
euro area. Based on these findings, the prescrip-
tion that central banks should specifically react to 
developments in global output gaps does not seem 
to be justified for the euro area.
No. 14
The Effect of  Trade with Low-Income 
Countries on U.S. Industry
Raphael Auer and Andreas M. Fischer
abstract: When labor-abundant nations grow, 
their exports increase more in labor-intensive 
sectors than in capital-intensive sectors. We utilize 
this sectoral difference in how exports are affected 
by growth to identify the causal effect of trade with 
low-income countries (LICs) on U.S. industry. Our 
framework relates differences in sectoral inflation 
rates to differences in comparative-advantage-
induced import growth rates and abstracts from 
aggregate fluctuations and sector-specific trends. 
In a panel covering 325 manufacturing industries 
from 1997 to 2006, we find that LIC exports are 
associated with strong downward pressure on U.S. 
producer prices and a large effect on productivity. 
When LIC exporters capture 1 percent U.S. market 
share, producer prices decrease by 3.1 percent, 
which is nearly fully accounted by a 2.4 percent 
increase in productivity and a 0.4 percent decrease 
in markups. We also document that while LICs on 
average find it easier to penetrate sectors with elas-
tic demand, the price and productivity response to 
import competition is much stronger in industries 
with inelastic demand. Overall, between 1997 and 
2006, the effect of LIC trade on manufacturing PPI 
inflation was around 2 percentage points per year, 
far too large to be neglected in macroeconomic 
analysis.
No. 15
Variety, Globalization, and Social 
Efficiency 
W. Michael Cox and Roy J. Ruffin 
abstract: This paper puts recent work on the ben-
efits of variety into the context of a more complete 
quantitative analysis of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman 
model of monopolistic competition. We show how 
the gains from globalization are reflected in the in-
crease in variety and the exploitation of economies 
of scale, and that the social efficiency question is 
quantitatively insignificant. These results follow 
from examining a Bertrand–Nash equilibrium that 
allows for a finite number of varieties to affect the 
elasticity of demand facing each firm. We develop 
a precise expression for per capita real income 
with any number of sectors where globalization 
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No. 16
Technical Note on ‘The Real Exchange 
Rate in Sticky Price Models: 
Does Investment Matter?’ 
Enrique Martinez-Garcia and Jens Søndergaard
abstract: This technical note is developed as a 
mathematical companion to the paper “The Real 
Exchange Rate in Sticky Price Models: Does Invest-
ment Matter?” (Institute Working Paper no. 17). It 
contains three basic calculations. First, we derive 
the equilibrium conditions of the model. Second, 
we compute the zero-inflation, zero-trade balance 
(deterministic) steady state. Third, we describe 
the log-linearization of the equilibrium conditions 
around the deterministic steady state. Simultane-
ously, we explain the system of equations that 
constitutes the basis for the paper to broaden its 
scope. Commentary is provided whenever neces-
sary to complement the model description and to 
place into context the assumptions embedded in 
our DSGE framework.
No. 17
The Real Exchange Rate in Sticky Price 
Models: Does Investment Matter? 
Enrique Martinez-Garcia and Jens Søndergaard
abstract: This paper re-examines the ability 
of sticky-price models to generate volatile and 
persistent real exchange rates. We use a DSGE 
framework with pricing-to-market akin to those in 
Chari et al. (2002) and Steinsson (2008) to illus-
trate the link between real exchange rate dynam-
ics and what the model assumes about physical 
capital. We show that adding capital accumulation 
to the model facilitates consumption smoothing 
and significantly impedes the model’s ability to 
generate volatile real exchange rates. Our analysis, 
therefore, caveats the results in Steinsson (2008), 
who shows how real shocks in a sticky-price model 
without capital can replicate the observed real 
exchange rate dynamics. Finally, we find that the 
CKM (2002) persistence anomaly remains robust 
to several alternative capital specifications, includ-
ing set-ups with variable capital utilization and 
investment adjustment costs (see, e.g., Christiano 
et al., 2005). In summary, the PPP puzzle is still 
very much alive and well.
No. 18
Some Preliminary Evidence on the 
Globalization–Inflation Nexus 
Sophie Guilloux and Enisse Kharroubi
abstract: The aim of this paper is to evaluate the 
impact of globalization, if any, on inflation and the 
inflation process. We estimate standard Phillips 
curve equations on a panel of OECD countries 
over the last 25 years. While recent papers have 
concluded that globalization has had no sig-
nificant impact, this paper highlights that trying 
to capture globalization effects through simple 
measures of import prices and/or imports to GDP 
ratios can be misleading. To do so, we try to extend 
the analysis following two different avenues. We 
first separate between commodity and noncom-
modity imports and show that the impact on infla-
tion of commodity import price inflation is qualita-
tively different from the impact of noncommodity 
import price inflation, the former depending on 
the volume of commodity imports while the latter 
being independent of the volume of noncommod-
ity imports. This first piece of evidence highlights 
the role of contestability and the insufficiency of 
trade volume statistics to properly describe the 
impact of globalization. This leads us to adopt a 
more systematic approach to capture the contents 
and not only the volume of trade. Focusing on the 
role of intra-industry trade, we provide preliminary 
evidence that this variable can account (i) for the 
low pass-through of import price to consumer 
price and (ii) for the flattening of the Phillips curve, 
i.e., the lower sensitivity of inflation to changes 
in output gap. We hence conclude that differ-
ent facets of globalization, especially changes in 
the nature of goods traded, can be an important 
channel through which globalization affects the 
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No. 19
Default and the Maturity Structure 
in Sovereign Bonds 
Cristina Arellano and Ananth Ramanarayanan
abstract: This paper studies the maturity com-
position and the term structure of interest rate 
spreads of government debt in emerging markets. 
We document that in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
and Russia, when interest rate spreads rise, debt 
maturity shortens and the spread on short-term 
bonds is higher than on long-term bonds. To ac-
count for this pattern, we build a dynamic model 
of international borrowing with endogenous 
default and multiple maturities of debt. Short-term 
debt can deliver higher immediate consumption 
than long-term debt; large long-term loans are not 
available because the borrower cannot commit to 
save in the near future toward repayment in the far 
future. However, issuing long-term debt can insure 
against the need to roll over short-term debt at 
high interest rate spreads. The trade-off between 
these two benefits is quantitatively important for 
understanding the maturity composition in emerg-
ing markets. When calibrated to data from Brazil, 
the model matches the dynamics in the maturity 
of debt issuances and its comovement with the 
level of spreads across maturities.
No. 20
An International Perspective on 
Oil Price Shocks and U.S. 
Economic Activity
Nathan S. Balke, Stephen P. A. Brown and 
Mine K. Yücel
abstract: The effect of oil price shocks on U.S. 
economic activity seems to have changed since 
the mid-1990s. A variety of explanations have 
been offered for the seeming change—including 
better luck, the reduced energy intensity of the U.S. 
economy, a more flexible economy, more experi-
ence with oil price shocks and better monetary 
policy. These explanations point to a weakening 
of the relationship between oil prices shocks and 
economic activity rather than the fundamentally 
different response that may be evident since the 
mid-1990s. Using a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model of world economic activity, we 
employ Bayesian methods to assess how econom-
ic activity responds to oil price shocks arising from 
supply shocks and demand shocks originating in 
the United States or elsewhere in the world. We 
find that both oil supply and oil demand shocks 
have contributed significantly to oil price fluctua-
tions and that U.S. output fluctuations are derived 
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Globalization and 
Monetary Policy
Excerpted from Richard W. Fisher’s 
Warren and Anita Manshel Lecture in American Foreign Policy 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
November 3, 2005
I want to talk about what I consider one of the 
biggest challenges my colleagues and I face: glo-
balization’s impact on the gearing of the economy 
and the making of monetary policy. 
The literature on globalization is large. The 
literature on monetary policy is vast. But literature 
examining the combination of the two is surpris-
ingly small.
What gives? Is the process of globalization 
disconnected from monetary policy? Is the busi-
ness of the central bank totally divorced from 
globalization?
I think not. I believe globalization and mon-
etary policy are intertwined in a complex narrative 
that is only beginning to unfold.
First, a definition, so that we can contemplate 
this matter together from common ground. There 
are many convoluted definitions of globalization. 
Mine is simple: Globalization is an ecosystem in 
which economic potential is no longer defined or 
contained by political and geographic boundaries. 
Economic activity knows no bounds in a global-
ized economy. A globalized world is one where 
goods, services, financial capital, machinery, 
money, workers and ideas migrate to wherever 
they are most valued and can work together most 
efficiently, flexibly and securely.
Where does monetary policy come into play 
in this world? Well, consider the task of the central 
banker, seeking to conduct a monetary policy that 
will achieve maximum sustainable noninflationary 
growth.
Consider, for example, the experience of 
former Federal Reserve Governor Larry Meyer, 
articulated in his excellent little book A Term at 
the Fed. In it, you get a good sense of the lexicon 
of monetary policy deliberations. The language of 
Fedspeak is full of sacrosanct terms such as “out-
put gap” and “capacity constraints” and “the natural 
rate of unemployment,” known by its successor 
acronym, NAIRU, the non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment. Central bankers want GDP 
to run at no more than its theoretical limit, for ex-
ceeding that limit for long might stoke the fires of 
inflation. They do not wish to strain the economy’s 
capacity to produce. 
One key capacity factor is the labor pool. 
There is a shibboleth known as the Phillips curve, 
which posits that beyond a certain point too much 
employment ignites demand for greater pay, with 
eventual inflationary consequences for the entire 
economy. 
Until only recently, the econometric calcula-
tions of the various capacity constraints and gaps 
of the U.S. economy were based on assumptions 
of a world that exists no more. Meyer’s book is a 
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real eye-opener because it describes in great detail 
the learning process of the FOMC [Federal Open 
Market Committee] members as the U.S. economy 
morphed into the new economic environment of 
the second half of the 1990s. At the time, economic 
growth was strong and accelerating. The unem-
ployment rate was low, approaching levels unseen 
since the 1960s. In these circumstances, if you 
believed in the Phillips curve and the prevailing 
views of potential output growth, capacity con-
straints and the NAIRU, inflation was supposed to 
rise. That is precisely what the models used by the 
Federal Reserve staff were saying, as was Meyer 
himself, joined by nearly all the other Fed gover-
nors and presidents gathered around the FOMC 
table. Under the circumstances, they concluded 
that monetary policy needed to be tightened 
to head off the inevitable. They were frustrated 
by Chairman Greenspan’s insistence that they 
postpone the rate hikes they were proposing, yet 
perplexed that inflation wasn’t rising. Indeed, infla-
tion just kept on falling.
If the advice of Meyer and other devotees of 
the Phillips curve, capacity constraints, output 
gaps and NAIRU had prevailed, the Fed would 
have caused the economy to seriously underper-
form. 
Now, how was Greenspan able to get it right 
when other very smart men and women did not? 
Well, we now recognize with 20/20 hindsight that 
Greenspan was the first to grasp the fact that an 
acceleration in productivity had begun to alter the 
traditional relationships among economic vari-
ables. He understood the data and the modeling 
techniques of the Fed’s research staff. But he was 
also constantly talking—and listening—to business 
leaders. 
It is important to listen to the operators of our 
business economy. America’s business managers 
have taken advantage of the phenomenon of glo-
balization. Our business managers are the nerve 
endings in Adam Smith’s invisible hand, stretch-
ing the fingers of capitalism into every corner of 
comparative advantage worldwide.
Just consider what the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s “capital-
ist road” in China and India’s embrace of market 
reforms mean to a business operator. Consider 
labor alone. In the early ’90s, the former Soviet 
Union released millions of hungry workers into the 
system. China joined the World Trade Organiza-
tion at the turn of the century and injected 750 
million workers into play. And now India, with 
over 100 million English-speaking workers among 
its 1 billion people, has joined the game. 
What does an American manager—paid to 
enhance returns to shareholders by growing rev-
enues at the lowest possible costs—do? Because 
labor accounts for, on average, about two-thirds of 
the cost of producing most goods and services, a 
business manager will go where labor is cheapest. 
She will have a widget made in China or Vietnam, 
or a software program written in Russia or Estonia, 
or a center for processing calls or managing a back 
office set up in India.
Let me return home to Harvard once more 
and read you three quotes from Joseph Schum-
peter, who taught here from 1932 until 1949, and I 
think you will get the picture.
First, from Capitalism, Socialism, and De-
mocracy: “The fundamental impulse that sets and 
keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from 
the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of 
production or transportation, the new markets, the 
new forms of industrial organization that capitalist 
enterprise creates.”
From that same page: “The opening up of new 
markets, foreign or domestic, and the organi-
zational development from the craft shop and 
factory … illustrate the same process of industrial 
mutation … that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly 
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new 
one. This process of creative destruction is the 
essential fact about capitalism. It is … what every 
capitalist concern has got to live in.”
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And from volume one of Schumpeter’s Busi-
ness Cycles: “A railroad through new country, i.e., 
a country not yet served by railroads, as soon as 
it gets into working order upsets all conditions of 
location, all cost calculations, all production func-
tions within its radius of influence; and hardly any 
‘ways of doing things’ which have been optimal 
before remain so afterward.”
String the key operative phrases of those three 
citations together and you get the plot of this story, 
the plot of globalization: “The opening up of new 
markets, foreign or domestic … revolutionizes the 
economic structure, … destroying the old one, … 
creating a new one…. [It] upsets all conditions of 
location, all cost calculations, all production func-
tions, … and hardly any ways of doing things which 
have been optimal before remain so afterward.”
The destruction of communism and the cre-
ation of vast new sources of inputs and production 
have upset all the calculations and equations that 
the very best economics minds, including those of 
the Federal Reserve staff—and I consider them the 
best of all—have used as their guideposts. The old 
models simply do not apply to the new, real world. 
You could sense something was wrong with 
the econometric equations if you listened to the 
troops on the ground, fighting in the trenches of 
the marketplace. This is what Chairman Green-
span does so well. And, though I am no Greenspan 
and never will be, this is what my colleagues and I 
on the FOMC do by making dozens upon dozens 
of calls to CEOs, COOs and CFOs of businesses, 
large and small, every month to prepare for FOMC 
meetings. We are simply observing managers at 
work expanding the capacity of our economy, 
expanding the gap between what their previously 
limited resources would allow them to produce 
and what their newly expanded globalized, tech-
nologically enhanced reach now allows them to 
produce. 
From this, I personally conclude that we need 
to redraw the Phillips curve and rejig the equations 
that inform our understanding of the maximum 
sustainable levels of U.S. production and growth.
Let me illustrate the point by citing another 
fine writer, Greg Ip. In yesterday’s Wall Street 
Journal, he noted that the “U.S. economy grew at a 
3.8% annual rate in the third quarter [of this year], 
its eighth consecutive quarter at about that pace. 
That’s above what most economists consider the 
economy’s potential growth rate—that is, what it 
can produce with existing capital and labor.”
How can economists quantify with such 
precision what the U.S. can produce with existing 
labor and capital when we don’t know the full ex-
tent of the global labor pool we can access? Or the 
totality of the financial and intellectual capital that 
can be drawn on to produce what we produce?
As long as we are able to hold back the devil of 
protectionism and keep open international capital 
markets and remain an open economy, how can 
we calculate an “output gap” without knowing the 
present capacity of, say, the Chinese and Indian 
economies? How can we fashion a Phillips curve 
without imputing the behavioral patterns of for-
eign labor pools? How can we formulate a regres-
sion analysis to capture what competition from all 
these new sources does to incentivize American 
management?
Until we are able to do so, we can only 
surmise what globalization does to the gearing of 
the U.S. economy, and we must continue driving 
monetary policy by qualitative assessment as we 
work to perfect our quantitative tool kit. At least 
that is my view.
—Richard W. Fisher
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Making Sense of Today’s 
Globalized Economy
A Conversation with Charles Engel
Q. What are some important themes 
of globalization?
A. One of them is that global trade is increasing. If 
you look at importing and exporting as a percent-
age of world gross domestic product, it’s grown 
by leaps and bounds over the past 20 or 30 years. 
That’s been true not only for the U.S. but also for 
just about everyone else. 
From the U.S. perspective, one of the most 
striking things is how much our trade with China 
has increased. A lot of that has come at the ex-
pense of trade with Korea and Japan, so it’s not just 
that we’re buying goods from China that we used 
to make at home.
The other thing is financial markets. They’re 
much more intertwined than they ever have been. 
Part of this is because governments have allowed 
their residents to do more foreign investing and al-
lowed foreign investors to buy more of their coun-
tries’ assets. That’s a trend that started in the early 
1960s. For the U.S, Western Europe and Canada, 
most of that liberalization was completed by the 
end of the 1970s. In Asia, it continued to happen in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
The trend more recently hasn’t been govern-
ments relaxing regulations but just the amount of 
innovation in financial markets and the willing-
ness of people to invest in financial assets around 
the globe. 
Q. How does this globalization impact 
the current financial crisis?
A. In general, well-working financial markets 
perform better if they’re globalized. It’s better to be 
able to spread risk across a number of countries. 
It’s better to be able to channel savings to their 
most productive uses anywhere in the world. If 
capital markets mess up, if they’re misallocating 
resources or if there’s something wrong with the 
financial system, it’s going to be magnified if finan-
cial markets are globalized.
Certainly, we’re very aware of the international 
aspects of this financial catastrophe. We can’t build 
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a wall around American banks. For example, in 
the current crisis, there’s no way to “rescue” only 
U.S. banks. If we successfully shore up the balance 
sheets of U.S. banks, this is good for the global bank-
ing system. This highlights why we need internation-
al cooperation. There’s a big incentive for each coun-
try to sit on the sidelines and let other countries take 
the risk and incur the expense of a financial rescue. 
We need some way to get all the major countries 
committed to a mutually agreed upon scheme to 
regulate international capital markets and ensure 
that they function smoothly in the future.
Q. What challenges does this financial 
crisis present for globalized financial 
markets?
A. It’s clear we needed more oversight of finan-
cial markets. A general worry is that we’ll impose 
too much, that we’ll throw too much sand in the 
wheels. Part of that would be stifling globalization. 
We don’t want to lose the benefits of a globalized 
financial system. 
A separate but related worry is that there’s 
going to be some kind of economic nationalism, 
with countries treating domestic and foreign-owned 
institutions differently. I worry that without interna-
tional cooperation, each country will try to devise 
schemes that favor its own banks and citizens at the 
expense of foreign investors. For example, countries 
might provide deposit insurance—but only for their 
own citizens. We could end up taking a giant step 
backward in the globalization of capital markets.
The thing we have to realize is that our finan-
cial system is intertwined with the rest of the world. 
The failure of a large international banking concern 
could harm our economy, just as financial troubles 
in the U.S. spill over into the rest of the world. We 
need to address this problem systematically, not in 
the ad hoc way we’re forced to during a crisis. 
Q. What are your current research 
interests?
A. There are two main threads to my research. 
One is trying to understand exchange rate 
movements—why they behave the way they do. 
My work in that area has involved thinking hard 
about the implications of exchange rates as asset 
prices, which spills over into the way asset prices in 
general behave.
Currency values don’t depend only on current 
economic fundamentals, such as trade balances, 
money supply and national income. The asset-
price approach pays attention not only to current 
data but also to expectations of what the funda-
mentals will be in the future. 
One of the key things that comes out of the 
work is the observation that asset prices, includ-
ing exchange rates, are unpredictable under 
much more general circumstances than many 
economists have believed. Simply put, we can’t 
do a good job of forecasting changes in exchange 
rates. That has implications for policymakers. It has 
implications for Wall Street. It has implications for 
international business.
Q. So the time and effort investors 
and companies spend trying to fore-
cast exchange rates is just a waste? 
A. I do think there are times when currency prices 
get out of line, and we can forecast an eventual 
return to more sustainable levels. When the euro 
cost $1.60 earlier this year, I was pretty sure it 
would come down, just as I was pretty sure it 
would rise when it was down around 85 cents 
several years ago. 
But I am talking in these cases about a fore-
cast over a long horizon. I sure wouldn’t want to try 
to predict which way exchange rates are going to 
go over the next couple of months or even the next 
couple of quarters.
Asset-price forecasters have a high propen-
sity to fool themselves about how successful their 
prediction schemes are. A lot of models might look 
good with hindsight. But there isn’t much rigor-
ous, peer-reviewed evidence that we can forecast 
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Q. And the other thread in your 
research?
A. I’ve been looking at aspects of open economies 
for monetary policy. The study of monetary policy 
is really dominated by this closed-economy frame-
work, which is kind of crazy. What economy in the 
world is closed? Openness matters for monetary 
policy in a lot of different ways. To what extent, 
for example, should monetary policy worry about 
exchange rate misalignments? 
I like to use the example of the recent rise in 
the price of oil from below $20 a barrel to up to 
$147. In the early part of that period, when it went 
from the $20s to about $45 a barrel, the price didn’t 
go up at all in Europe. How is that possible? How 
could it be nearly doubling for us and not going up 
in Europe?
The answer is that the dollar was losing 
value against the euro at a rate equal to the price 
increase of oil. There’s no economic reason in the 
world that oil should have gotten more expensive 
for Americans and not gotten more expensive for 
Europeans. That’s purely a result of exchange rate 
misalignments. It leads to an inefficient allocation 
of resources. There’s no reason Americans should 
have had to cut back on oil consumption more 
than Europeans.
It’s exactly because of situations like this that 
monetary policy ought to worry about exchange 
rates. Moreover, the exchange rate is something 
monetary policy can influence—the value of the 
dollar in terms of the euro, for example. 
The focus of monetary policy has been almost 
completely on reducing inflation, which is impor-
tant. A credible monetary policymaker has to keep 
inflation low, but another part of credible mon-
etary policy is keeping the currency strong.
Q. Why should a strong dollar be a 
goal of monetary policy?
A. I wouldn’t say a strong dollar. I would say that 
a goal of monetary policy is to prevent large dollar 
misalignments. We don’t want it too strong or too 
weak. Remember, in the early part of this decade, 
the dollar was very strong, and our manufactur-
ing sector was getting hammered. We had a hard 
time competing in world markets, even in sectors 
in which the U.S. is a world leader, like aircraft, 
sophisticated industrial equipment and high tech. 
Our economy adapted—resources got shifted 
into construction and services—but in retrospect 
maybe the reallocation wasn’t such a great use 
of our resources. If we had more actively tried to 
prevent the appreciation of the dollar, that shift in 
workers and investment away from manufacturing 
would have been slowed down.
Q. What contribution can the Dal-
las Fed’s Globalization and Monetary 
Policy Institute make?
A. As you know, the institute is focused on how 
monetary policy is influenced by international 
forces. A great thing about the Federal Reserve 
System is that it has 12 independent research staffs 
that provide a portfolio of research skills and policy 
insights. I agreed to join the Dallas Fed’s efforts on 
globalization because I think this subject is crucial, 
its importance is growing, and there wasn’t enough 
attention to these issues in the System.
Richard Fisher, the Dallas Fed’s president, 
has talked a lot about trying to understand how 
openness feeds into domestic inflation. That’s an 
important question with obvious relevance to cen-
tral bankers, but I think there are other important 
questions that we should be thinking about. 
The exchange rate itself, should we worry 
about that? In thinking about unemployment, 
do we have to worry about the effects of foreign 
competition? Beyond those issues, the big thing 
we need to think about right now is the Fed’s other 
role—not in setting monetary policy but in keeping 
a well-functioning financial system intact. There, I 
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Director of the Institute
Mark A. Wynne 
joined the Federal 
Reserve Bank of 
Dallas in 1989 and is 
currently a senior 
economist and vice 
president. He is 
widely published in many leading professional 
journals. During 1997–98, Wynne worked on 
issues related to monetary policy strategy under 
economic and monetary union for the European 
Monetary Institute and, later, the European Central 
Bank. He holds first-class honors B.A. and M.A. 
degrees from the National University of Ireland 
(University College, Dublin) and an M.A. and a 
Ph.D. from the University of Rochester.
Advisory Board Chairman
John B. Taylor is 
Mary and Robert 
Raymond Professor 
of Economics at 
Stanford University. 
He is a globally 
recognized expert on 
international monetary and financial issues and 
has produced extensive research on monetary 
policy, fiscal policy and international economic 
policy. Taylor is recognized throughout the 
economics profession and within monetary policy 
circles as the originator of the Taylor rule, a guiding 
principle for macroeconomic stabilization 
followed by many central banks. He also serves as 
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and 
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 
was founding director of the Stanford Introductory 
Economics Center and is a research associate at 
the National Bureau of Economic Research. Taylor 
has many years of distinguished service with the 
U.S. government, most recently as undersecretary 
of Treasury for international affairs from 2001 to 
2005. He was a member of the president’s Council 
of Economic Advisers from 1989 to 1991. He 
received a B.A. in economics from Princeton 
University and a Ph.D. in economics from Stanford 
University.
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Senior Fellows
W. Michael Cox, 
senior vice president 
and chief economist, 
joined the Dallas Fed 
in 1984. Cox authors 
the Bank’s annual 
report essays, which 
have received extensive attention from leading 
publications such as the Wall Street Journal, New 
York Times and USA Today. He is also widely 
published in the nation’s leading economic 
journals. Cox received an undergraduate degree in 
business and economics from Hendrix College 
and a Ph.D. in economics from Tulane University. 
Mario Crucini is an 
associate professor 
of economics at 
Vanderbilt Univer-
sity. He is currently 
an associate editor of 
the Journal of 
International Economics and the Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking. He is also a member of the 
board of editors of the Review of International 
Economics. Crucini has written widely on interna-
tional business cycles, the contribution of trade 
policy to the Great Depression and, most recently, 
international pricing. He received a B.A. from the 
University of Western Ontario and an M.A. and 
Ph.D. from the University of Rochester. 
Michael B. 
Devereux is profes-
sor of economics 
at the University of 
British Columbia 
and a visiting scholar 
at the International 
Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C. He is widely 
published in leading economic journals and is 
associate editor of the International Journal of 
Central Banking. He received a B.A. in econom-
ics and politics and an M.A. in economics from 
University College, Dublin, and Ph.D. from Queen’s 
University, Kingston, Ontario. 
Charles Engel is 
professor of 
economics at the 
University of 
Wisconsin–Madison 
and a research 
associate of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. He has 
written extensively on exchange rate determina-
tion. He is currently coeditor of the Journal of Inter-
national Economics and has been a visitor or 
consultant to many central banks, including the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, De 
Nederlandsche Bank, Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Bank of England and several Federal Reserve 
Banks. He received a B.A. from the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a Ph.D. from the 
University of California–Berkeley.
Francis E. Warnock 
is associate professor 
of business adminis-
tration at the Darden 
Graduate School of 
Business at the 
University of 
Virginia. He is currently a faculty research fellow at 
the National Bureau of Economic Research and a 
research associate at the Institute for International 
Integration Studies at Trinity College Dublin. He 
was recently a consultant at the International 
Monetary Fund and a research fellow at the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority. In addition, he served 
for several years as senior economist in the 
International Finance Division at the Federal 
Reserve Board. Warnock received a B.A. from 
Johns Hopkins University and Ph.D. from the 
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Institute Staff Economists
Simona E. Cociuba 
joined the Dallas Fed 
in 2007. Her major 
fields of concentra-
tion are macroeco-
nomics, growth and 
development. She 
recently received a Ph.D. in economics from the 
University of Minnesota.
Anthony Landry 
joined the Federal 
Reserve Bank of 
Dallas in 2006. 
Previously, he 
worked at the Bank 
of Canada. Landry’s 
recent research focuses on the effects of nominal 
rigidities in the context of open-economy macro-
economic models. He holds an M.A. in economics 
from McGill University and a Ph.D. in economics 








monetary economics and applied econometrics. 
Previously, Martinez-Garcia was a teaching and 
research assistant at the University of Wisconsin–
Madison and at the university’s Center for World 
Affairs and the Global Economy. He also worked at 
the Bank of England. He holds a B.A. from the 
University of Alicante in Spain, an M.A. from the 
University of Pennsylvania and a Ph.D. from the 
UW–Madison, all in economics.
Ananth 
Ramanarayanan 
joined the Dallas 
Fed in 2007, after 
receiving a Ph.D. in 
economics from the 
University of Min-
nesota. His research interests are in the fields of 
international trade and macroeconomics. 






al finance and 
monetary economics. Prior to joining the Bank, he 
taught at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He 
holds an M.A. from the University of Arkansas and 
a Ph.D. in economics from UW–Madison. 
Support Staff
Janet Koech has 
been an economic 




October 2007. Koech 
holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in economics from 
the University of Kansas. She is from Kenya.
Patrick Roy began 
working at the Dallas 
Fed as a research 
assistant in Novem-
ber 2007. He 
graduated from 
Bentley College in 
2005 with a B.S. in economics. Roy was deployed to 
Iraq as a platoon leader in 2006–07 and still serves 
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